The stats, then, suggest that Arbeloa has been a downgrade. In a tenure from the Club World Cup to early January, Alonso’s Madrid stats read: 34 games, 24 wins, six defeats – far from damning, but simply not good enough at a club where the expectation is to win every single game (no matter how unrealistic that remit may be). He lost games to PSG, Liverpool, Atletico Madrid, Celta Vigo, Barcelona and Man City. None of those results are good. The loss against Celta, in particular, was damning. Being defeated at Anfield, and then in the Supercopa final to Barca, were body blows.
But most of those losses came to teams that were either as good as, or better than Los Blancos. Arbeloa, meanwhile, has been erratic. His stat line reads: 20 games, 13 wins, six losses, one draw. His win percentage is lower than Alonso’s. Defeats have come at the hands of Bayern, Mallorca, Getafe, Osasuna, Benfica and Albacete.
Perhaps more revealing, too, is the way that the two managers have changed their modus operandi. Alonso was, in effect, a systems guy until the very end. Sure, he tinkered to allow for Vinicius Jr and Kylian Mbappe to play together. But he always insisted on a defensive work rate. He wanted a more controlled, steadier style of play. Like most modern managers, he gave individuals specific tasks and entrusted that they would execute them. It’s what got him fired, in the end.
Funnily enough, it’s with that kind of attitude that Arbeloa impressed in the Madrid academy. He was a 4-3-3 loyalist whose biggest achievements were the development of tempo-controlling footballers such as Thiago Pitarch – who has since broken into the first team. Arbeloa’s teams wanted the ball, but they also played fast. They took chances, moved through the thirds, but retained a key structure.
